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ABSTRACT

Administration is defined as the enactment of moral choices influencing subordinates within an organizational setting. It is distinguished from management, which is considered to involve a lower level of discretion. Educational administration is therefore in the moral domain; it involves discretionary, moral choices in a field that is itself moral in intent and execution. The empirical, positivist conceptualization of educational administration dominant in the United States is essentially inappropriate because it covertly ignores the moral heart of the field. It assumes that generalizations about effective and ineffective administration can be discovered through social science and that these generalizations will be applicable regardless of the goals being addressed. The subjectivist, phenomenological alternative is also unhelpful. Although it recognizes the importance of personal values, it treats them as morally equivalent, objective phenomena. The contemporary rise of traditionalism suggests that increasing numbers of laypersons are demanding that education be grounded in the fundamental moral perspective of our cultural traditions. Thus administrators must be educated to develop wisdom rather than know-how and must be respected for their moral commitment more than for their ability to manage power and manipulate people. (Author/PGD)

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The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education

Traditionalism and Educational Administration

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Administration is defined as the enactment of moral choices influencing subordinates within an organizational setting. It is distinguished from management which is considered to involve a lower level of discretion. Educational administration is therefore in the moral domain; it involves discretionary, moral choices in a field which is itself moral in intent and execution.

The approach to the field dominant in the U.S.A. is essentially inappropriate because it covertly ignores the moral heart of the field. It assumes that generalizations about effective and ineffective administration can be discovered by social science and that they will be applicable regardless of the goals being addressed. However, the subjectivist, phenomenological alternative is unhelpful. Although it recognizes the importance of personal values, it treats them as morally equivalent, objective phenomena.

The contemporary rise of traditionalism suggest that increasing numbers of laypersons are demanding that education be grounded in the fundamental moral perspective of our cultural traditions. Thus administrators must be educated to develop wisdom rather than know-how and must be respected for their moral commitment more than for their ability to manage power and manipulate people.

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TRADITIONALISM AND EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION[1]

A Paper Presented to AERA, San Francisco, 1986

Mark Holmes, O.I.S.E.

Introduction

Administration involves, irreducibly, the enactment of moral choices influencing subordinates within an organizational setting. Applied to education, administration takes on a second moral component, education itself necessarily being a moral enterprise. When the education of the young becomes translated into mass schooling, an obvious and unavoidable source for its social framework is society's cultural inheritance. The traditional moral base of western society is a sound foundation for educational administration.

Administration

Hodgkinson (1978) makes a useful, working distinction between administration and management. It is not a practical one in the everyday sense that school principals should decide, before they suspend a student for smoking in school, whether the act of suspension is administrative or managerial. The distinction is useful because it divides behavior that has a strong moral and volitional component from behavior that has not. Administrative acts are related to the development of policy, the creation of precedent, the expression of values, and the exercise of professional discretion. Managerial acts are concerned primarily with the implementation of policy, the following of precedent and the

application of norms and rules. Good administration involves the conscious and wise application of moral choice. In an orderly world, administrators would administer and managers would manage. In our world, administrators spend a great deal of their time managing.

Suppose we were to present medals for exemplary administration. Few would countenance giving a gold medal to the chief executive officer of the Belsen concentration camp, irrespective of the evidence adduced to demonstrate efficiency in the achievement of objectives. To use a less clear-cut, less extreme case, many would hesitate to give a medal to the administrator of a modern pig farm, whose achievement of superb productivity depended on keeping the pigs, with eyes and nails removed, strapped to a moving belt--from birth to bacon.

Now it may be argued that the moral components identified in administration are merely those of life itself, that every conscious act has some moral content. By this argument, the manager who carries out the administrators' policies at Belsen is also morally responsible. Indeed, the locksmith who produces keys to be used in the camp is culpable.

Despite the lack of a hard and fast dividing line of moral responsibility, we do systematically assume varying levels. Hitler is more guilty than the administrators who developed policies to further his goals, and they, in turn, are more guilty than workers, with more inhibited freedom, who followed orders. The locksmith is less guilty than the soldier who herded the innocent into gas chambers.

No one denies that administration involves values. So why is it important to establish the centrality of values in administration? Let us suppose two secondary principals are being evaluated, their planned changes forming part of

the evaluation. One has introduced a reform whereby every student gives service to the community before graduating; the other a reform whereby the method of instruction in English has changed noticeably, but without evidence of improved outcomes. Both changes are introduced efficiently and effectively. Assume there are no known side effects. The former deserves the better evaluation because the changed outcome is more likely to be supportive of my educational goals, and those, I believe, of the public community in which I live. Those who respond, "But that's not fair; you are imposing your values on fellow professionals," make my point. Administrative actions cannot and should not be seen in a value free framework. Now, no one will argue the moral equivalence of all educational objectives, but some may insist that the moral weight is determined by the policy-makers, not by the administrator. That brings us back full circle to the "just following orders" argument. In practice, administrators do not just follow orders; they cannot and they should not. Thus the choice between moral and amoral administration reduces to a matter of choice. However, that choice is not, at least not to the vast majority that believes in right and wrong, simply a matter of personal preference, like choosing between a Ford and a Chrysler. The hidden curriculum whereby schools of educational administration attempt to make administrators amoral is a symptom of what is wrong with the modern school and with the modern age.

Educational administration, I have said, is distinctive in that it is moral both because it involves the operationalization of conscious choices affecting the lives and purposes of others and because it involves an arena which is itself fundamentally moral. An amoral education, insofar as it is conceptually possible, negates morality.

Education has traditionally had both a personal and a societal aspect. That dichotomy is partially captured in the not entirely happy distinction made between education and socialization. Education of the individual is likely to involve the personal development of intellect, skills for daily survival, analytical reasoning, disciplined knowledge, moral virtue, physical fitness, and aesthetic appreciation and expression. The socialization of society's young requires not only certain aspects of personal development, but also development of the attributes of the good citizen, who has useful vocational as well as basic academic skills and who has the attitudes, habits and manners appropriate for the work place and for life in a community. Thus educational administrators have the moral responsibility of choosing the personal goals they would emphasize, of selecting the most desirable characteristics of the good citizen, and of determining a reasonable balance between personal fulfilment and social responsibility.

I have drawn two parallel distinctions: between personal fulfilment and responsibility to society and between education and socialization. Neither distinction is particularly tight conceptually; but together they illustrate the significance of administration in education. If administrators are fundamentally involved in the choice and mediation of values (and the most technocratic administrators will concede at least that they must work within a framework of values), then significant values central to educational choices should be important administrative concerns.

Although school administration is, at least in part, about the resolution of the conflict between individual and societal interests, there is some reluctance to acknowledge the inevitable conflict. I have not seen a single text on educational administration that deals with this topic as an important matter of administrative

significance. Leadership, organizational bureaucracy and decision making are dealt with as if these processes had worth quite independent of the ends to which they are put. Much is written on the need for sound working relationships between administrators and teachers, but little attempt is made to translate that concept into improved education for students, and none at all to examine the problem of mediating between individual and social needs.

Now perhaps it will be argued that today that conflict has vanished, individualism reigns triumphant, and schools are now concerned solely with the personal development of each child. While it is true that the rhetoric of individualism is dominant, the social reality of the school remains. Western society itself is individualistic, with narcissism seen less as a vice than a universal human characteristic, but that does not prevent conflict between individual and group demands--over gun control, abortion, public prayer and the sentencing of criminals. The decision to set up segregated classes for French immersion, for the gifted, or for the artistically talented, affects other students, whose instruction and social environment change in response to administrative manipulation of their social and academic context. If, in such situations, administrators genuinely believe they are dealing simply with individual fulfilment, they are dangerously ignorant. If they recognize the underlying conflict but ignore it, impelled by vociferous interest groups, they exemplify their crass and amoral training.

A comparable tension exists between education and credentials (or levels of schooling). Education involves the development of certain qualities which I have briefly summarized. Credentials serve to certify such qualities. Administrators are torn by conflicting demands. On the one hand, students and their parents demand the credentials necessary to pursue a chosen career, credentials which are

required for vocational and social success. There are pressures from educators (not always acting in self-interest) who argue that more education, operationalized as more schooling, is itself valuable and that society needs more highly educated individuals. On the other hand, administrators are aware both that credentials easily become devalued (see, for example, Fallows 1985) and that they are ethically unacceptable once they cease to denote some genuine educational quality. Once again, this complex moral problem facing both school and school district administrators is ignored by major, contemporary texts on educational administration.

Administration is a matter of significant value choices because it lies in the grey area between policy creation and policy implementation. Sometimes administrators are closely identified with policy development, and I include in this expression the deliberate renewal and propagation of existing policies, written or unwritten. At other times, their influence is much less in evidence, their tasks more managerial in nature. But, even managers, particularly when they are also professionals, should take some moral responsibility for their behavior.

I have suggested that modern education, broadly defined, contains within it ideas that are incongruous if not necessarily in perpetual conflict. Individual development, with the connotation of individual freedom, has to be reconciled with the good of society and the curtailment of freedom. That crucial conflict is evident at the highest levels of educational decision making as well as in the classroom. Further, there are conflicts between the self-interest of participants in schooling and educational interests. This latter conflict is compounded by two of the major functions fulfilled by schools--youth custody and social distribution (Holmes 1980). What schooling must do seems to be at odds with the legitimating

goals of education. For example, compulsory attendance makes the excitement of learning even more evanescent than it would otherwise be. Teachers' demands for more and more codification of their work and duties make the spontaneity and authenticity that are both the hallmark of creativity and the cement of social bonding at best occasional. All these conflicts must be mediated, and who but administrators can be educated for the task? There are important implications for the education and training of administrators, in whom wisdom and virtue are more to be valued than competence in the management of in-baskets.

The Study of Educational Administration

Neither of the two most popular approaches to the study of educational administration over the last two decades has been much concerned with wisdom, let alone with virtue. It is not my intention here to provide adequate descriptions of either of these two approaches. Greenfield (for example, 1984 and 1986) has provided a good picture of the ongoing conflict. A brief history is also to be found in Culbertson (1980). My purpose here is to illustrate in which ways my own position differs from the mainstream of empirical positivism and its major alternative.

A central, tacit assumption of the mainstream position is that the study of educational administration will provide useful administrative generalizations. There is not unanimity within the mainstream on the value of generalizations derived so far, but there is agreement on intent. I described elsewhere four reasons, given by MacIntyre (1981), why predictive generalizations in the social sciences are doomed to failure. "First, he uses Popper's example of early paleolithic people discussing prediction. How could they predict the invention of the wheel, as to predict it would be to invent it? Thus radical innovations are

unpredictable. Second, human beings are ultimately unpredictable in themselves. If we cannot always predict our own decisions, how can we expect to develop instruments to predict those of others? Third, he considers the "game-theoretic" character of life. Educational administrators consider whether such and such an idea will appeal to secondary mathematics teachers or elementary teachers or teachers' associations. They consider the "normal" logical predispositions of people in such roles, overlooking the individuality of the people holding them. Individual characteristics may predispose some people to make decisions very different from those considered normative. This, of course, is a point made well by the phenomenologists. Fourth, one of the greatest sources of error is contingency. Contingency plays an important part in many of our lives and in public events" (Holmes 1984, pp. 16 -17). I went on to add a fifth reason why prediction is particularly difficult within the so called "theory" of educational administration. I used the example of the generalization that decisions are more effective when those affected by them are involved in their making. "The belief in the empirical (and moral) correctness of this generalization is so widespread in education that it makes prediction both easier and more difficult; easier because it will often become a self-fulfilling prophecy (i.e. teachers may accept a decision--or reject a decision--partly on the grounds they were--or were not--consulted); more difficult because its being believed so strongly makes its difficult for observers to predict its inapplicability. Thus, beliefs in generalizations set their own patterns" (Holmes, 1984 p. 17).

The mainstream position is faulty in two ways. It is faulty because it has quite simply failed. There are no important, useful generalizations about administrative behavior supported by empirical findings. There are in existence

some partial truisms about administration, but they should not be confused with educational theory. The truisms exemplify one or more of the following characteristics: They precede the application and development of empirical science; they are admonitions, aphorisms; they are situation specific; they are moral statements; they are tautological; they are logically necessary consequences of the explicit or implicit assumptions. "The span of control should be reasonable." This is a sensible aphorism. It is also situation specific, as most schools illustrate. School administrators may be responsible for as many as fifty teachers, but then schools are not like industrial organizations. Teachers are professionals. Similarly, a hospital administrator may be responsible, in a way, for a hundred medical doctors.

"People who have worked on the development of something feel ownership of it." This is tautological insofar as it means that owners usually feel ownership. It is often interpreted to mean that administrators should involve people who are not in fact owners to give the illusion of ownership. This may sometimes be effective in implementing a particular plan, where for example, teachers are not used to being manipulated and have not heard about this technique. It is also unethical to treat professional teachers as objects.

"People like to have some control of their working environment." This is a truism, as is the contradictory statement that people like to have rules to govern the behavior of others. This is one of the reasons MacIntyre gives for our failure to predict the behavior of people in social organizations, we like others' behavior to be predictable, our own unpredictable. The important question here, in the school context, is a moral and ethical one: How much control of their

teaching **should** teachers have? Empirical science cannot address that question, as empirical investigation will produce different results depending on the normative environment in which the study takes place and on the consequences deemed most important.

Not only has empirical positivism failed but it cannot succeed because it is conceptually absurd to argue that sound administration can be defined independently of the good to which it is put. This second argument may have the appearance of a descent to semantics. Not so. I grant that some important managerial matters are reasonable subjects of investigation and improvement (scheduling; school design; data control etc.) but these managerial questions have not been the stuff of mainstream work in educational administration. My argument is that one's choice of values inevitably influences one's administrative methods and their effectiveness[2].

The subjectivist critics suggest that the alternative to the mainstream is to study individual administrators, to produce case studies and histories. This approach has its strengths. A number of reference points may well give a picture of educational administration, rather as an impression emerges from a pointillist picture. But the pointillist artist still knows the overall design; the contributors to phenomenology do not . Indeed, if their case studies are determined by a mind set in advance, their scholarship is endangered. The difficulty with drawing a design from one or more non-random reference points is obvious, but not necessarily heeded.

Both the empirical and the subjectivist approaches are attempts to find meaning. The mainstream tries to discover existing meaning by drawing on methodologies from the physical sciences, in the hope that laws governing people in

organizations will reveal themselves just as laws of genetic succession have revealed themselves to biologists. Subjectivists object to the entire notion of objective meaning, preferring the subjective meaning they find in their case studies; but they are trapped if they ask others to acknowledge some larger, generalized meaning from their studies. Thus the subjectivists are on the horns of a dilemma. If they truly believe in ultimate subjectivism, they must conduct case studies, with each one being a beginning and an end in itself. If they conduct case studies as implicit samples of a larger picture, their generalizations should be subject to the same laws of science as those of the mainstream.

As a traditionalist, I prefer to work within an assumption of a synthesized subjective and objective meaning. Truth exists but is elusive; it slips easily from our grasp; all visions are not equal. If life itself and education have some purpose, schooling becomes a means to an end. The study of education is analogous neither with the physical sciences nor with the social sciences. A better but still imperfect analogy is with other applied fields, such as dentistry, medicine and divinity. If medicine is concerned with the prolongation of human life, with the enhancement of health and with the prevention and cure of disease, then schooling, to traditionalists, is concerned with the development of certain agreed upon traits in young people. The study of educational administration should not therefore be concerned with finding non-existent objective truths about making schools effective irrespective of what outcomes one may have in mind, but with finding better ways to achieve one's clearly stated and assumed goals.

Thus traditionalists, although they share the criticisms of empirical science made by subjectivists, have no more sympathy with the idea that there are no administrative truths because there is no truth. The way to truth in educational

administration is to discover how to help learners along the right path.

Traditionalism and the Practice of Educational Administration

A traditionalist revival raises fundamental questions about the practice of educational administration. A traditionalist approach assumes some consensus about the purposes of education. Indeed, the rejection of tradition by influential sectors of society—academia, intelligentsia, media--is an important cause of the lack of consensus about educational goals.

There are two arenas in which consensus may be found. Either the public-at-large, the community, the jurisdiction, may come to understand a shared tradition of consensual goals, or there may be differentiated schooling within a given jurisdiction whereby parents with consensual goals may select a particular traditional, educational experience for their children.

Ironically, one of the practical difficulties of traditionalists in education today stems from their central belief in education for society, for citizenship, for character, for virtue. While extreme, individualistic interest groups have sought and succeeded in gaining segregated schooling to serve their goals (e.g. alternative, i.e. Deweyan, schools), traditionalists have usually tried to maintain their traditional ways in the common schools, precisely because the common school is itself a traditional reflection of society. In some parts of the western world they have been successful, but in many others, including the Province of Ontario from which I write, they have been singularly unsuccessful. Therein lies the traditionalist dilemma. There seems little prospect in many parts of Canada and the U.S.A of fighting off the liberal hegemony enforced by powerful interest groups, of teachers, administrators and faculties of education. In these settings, traditional schooling may only be possible in segregated settings.

As it is probable that a significant minority, even a majority in some parts, subscribes to traditional values in education, the prospect for modernist educational administrators, which is to say most administrators in public school systems, is threatening: Either school systems will become more traditionalist or they will face growing competition from newly formed traditionalist alternatives. Even worse for them, the two alternatives are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Administrators cannot simply assume that "their" public schools will become more relativist, more value-free, more progressive as the traditionalists are syphoned off into their own segregated schools. The public schools, facing competition from schools which are likely to be much more successful in teaching basic skills and developing character, may be forced, by competition , to become more like them.

Administrators of traditionalist schools will face a different set of conflicts from those to which they are accustomed. The directions, the goals, the priorities will be largely shared, although there will remain conflict among traditionalists of various stripes--must obviously between those who believe in tradition in terms of our broad and rich cultural inheritance and those who believe in a particular, revealed religious tradition. There will be significant conflict between the public and teachers, many of whom will not share the traditional values of the parents. The problem exists today, but it is moderated by the fact that teachers work in bureaucratic organizations quite representative of their secular, relativist values. The problem will become extremely evident when teachers live common-law, fail to uphold the idea of family, publicly announce homosexual preferences and undergo abortions. The conflict between the individual rights of employees, so well developed in the modernist environment in which we live, and the determination of parents to have children educated in their

own values (i.e. the values they uphold rather than those they live by), will be a difficult one to resolve.

MacIntyre has argued that the ruling ethic of modern times permits administrators to act the part of the disinterested, honest broker (MacIntyre 1981, p. 71). Because their image so well reflects the modern ethos, their public persona becomes fused with the private person; the tolerant, pragmatic, assured, impartial, managerial patina is all there is. This stereotypical administrator/manager really has no teleological philosophy; the philosophy is to have no firm beliefs that cannot be changed to suit a new government or a new set of trustees. To the extent that pessimistic picture is valid, the implications of traditionalism for the administrator are serious. Not only will administrators have to adopt a philosophy, they will have to act consistently with it, and, most serious of all, believe it. The more they spuriously try, the more they will fail.

Does all this presage a return to the nineteenth century, to the managers of virtue described by Tyack and Hansot (1982)? Yes and no. A resurgent traditionalism does suggest some moral certainty, a set of clear ideas to sustain society. In particular, it implies the nurturance of virtue. However, the nature of the tradition I am advocating is very different from the tradition of 1900, because tradition, like everything else, has changed.

Tradition and the Future of Educational Administration

Bowers (1985) argues that all liberal approaches to education are fundamentally nihilist. He goes on to assert that liberals must become aware of the dangers of Nietzsche's abyss and somehow steer clear of it. His generally cogent argument is at its weakest when he explains just how that abyss can be avoided, at it strongest when it demonstrates some of the common links among

quite different liberal philosophies. There is a line between those who believe in some absolute which ought to lie at the root of education and those who do not. Like most conceptual lines, between administration and management, between theism and atheism, its trajectory is not absolutely clear, but it is nonetheless an aid to understanding the map.

Interestingly, all four commentator on Bowers' paper share his overall perspective, although some are sharply critical of his argument. Stanley could have been writing for any one of the four when he wrote, "The siege lines surrounding liberal humanism continue to intensify, requiring us to reconsider our fortifications as well as the essentials of what it is we seek to defend. As this proceeds, my suspicion increases that we have more to fear from those who fear nihilism than we have from nihilism. Bowers's essay does not persuade me otherwise, thought its gracious and humane concerns confirm that we have nothing to fear from him" (1985, p. 503). The article and the commentaries illustrate the defensiveness of the academic educational establishment today. Their fear of tradition is pathological--and even debate among "ourselves", among friends, must be held sotto voce, lest it sustain the enemy.

As Shils points out, traditionality has been forced to bear the burden of all manner of evils.

> "Superstitions are certainly common among progressivists, secularists, and rationalists but traditionality has been made to bear the obloquy which superstition calls forth among progressivists; their own superstitions are spared. The same may be said of intolerance and dogmatism which were equally evils which enlightenment would eradicate. Traditionality no

more requires intolerance and dogmatism than do scientism, rationalism, and secularism. In the twentieth century the most destructive acts of intolerance have been committed by revolutionary regimes, the progressivist revolutionaries being scarcely less intolerant than the reactionary ones. Dogmas are not less common among progressivists than they are among those who would give the benefit of the doubt to tradition" (1981, p. 5).

For Shils, a tradition is something that "having been created through human actions, through thought and imagination. . . is handed down from one generation to the next" (1981 p. 12). It is accepted on the grounds of its existence in the past. This does not imply mindless acceptance of the old, but it does imply a preference for something old that has worked over something new that has not.

Shils goes on to explain specifically the value of traditions in educational institutions.

> "Yet human beings, at least most of them, much of the time do not fare well in a disordered world. They need to live within the framework of a world of which they possess a chart. They need categories and rules; they need criteria of judgment. They cannot construct these for themselves. This is one of the limits to the ideal of total emancipation and total self-regulation. Authorities in family, church, community, educational institutions, army, and factory cannot construct all of this chart, and those rudiments of the chart which they can present are limited in their range and their acceptance

depends on the legitimacy of their promulgators. Human beings need the help of their ancestors; they need the help which is provided by their own biological ancestors and they need the help of the ancestors of their communities and institutions, of the ancestors of their societies and their institutions.

The destruction or discrediting of these cognitive, moral, methaphysical, and technical charts is a step into chaos. Destructive criticism which is an extension of reasoned criticism, aggravated by hatred, annuls the benefits of reason and restrained emancipation" (1981, p. 236).

Contemporary administrators have assumed the opposite idea, that change in itself is good. Expressions such as, "This book was used twenty years ago," "Good heavens, that method of instruction goes back to the one room school," and "That school was built in the Dark Ages," are used pejoratively, not descriptively. Change becomes a badge to be worn as justification for or pride in promotion. Politicians and administrators have managed this contemporary myth to their mutual advantage--the ideal situation being that which exemplifies rapid motion without direction. If modern change is all process and no product, not only is there reduced possibility of negative evaluation, but change in children is so imperceptible that complaints from parents are muted. The ideal educational change, to the modern administrator, consists of frequent meetings; curriculum teams; implementation procedures; writing teams; conferences; in-service programs; complex models of communication and implementation--but no direction and absolutely no evaluation of the learning of students which might compare the

present invidiously with the past.

I came across an example of administrative dependence on change a few months ago in a course I was teaching on program development and implementation. I suggested that change should only be introduced in circumstances where we are fairly confident it will bring about improved results. A rather perceptive superintendent in the class commented dryly, "But what are we all going to do? Working on change is how most of us spend most of our time." He was rightly serious. A well-established traditional school system would probably operate with fewer administrators and helpers than do current school systems; there would be fewer meetings, more instruction. Simply, there would be less ambiguity and less frequent change. In that context, I do not expect the educational establishment, administrators, teachers, professors of education, to endorse a traditionalist system, any more than I would expect a beef farmer to recommend a vegetarian diet.

The argument is not being made that change is necessarily bad and tradition necessarily good. That would be as absurd as the converse--which is today's myth. There are healthy traditions surviving, usually for good reason, in most schools. Students are grouped in classes under one teacher. Elementary classes have homeroom teachers, who nurture as well as teach. Secondary school classes are specialized by subject, and teachers demand independent inquiry, applying universalistic standards of achievement. The traditional sequence predominates--presentation, review, seat work, homework, review, test, remediation, re-test. Elementary principals remain, for the most part, benevolent despots. Grading remains, despite all the attacks on it, essentially universalistic.

Other traditions have departed unlamented. Gender and race are no

longer considered reasonable grounds for discrimination in academic matters. Attempts are made to remove ability to pay as a criterion for post-secondary education; conservatives and liberals both agree on that, even though they disagree on the way of achieving equality of opportunity in terms of access.

But schools of educational administration should consider major changes in at least two of their current practices. The first derives directly from the argument of this paper. The art, and science, of educational administration in traditional schools will be concerned with the best means of achieving agreed upon ends. It will not be primarily concerned with leadership, decision making, and bureaucracy; it wil be concerned with developing the appropriate context for the best achievement of the high standards of behavior and academic work parents want.

The second change stems from the argument less directly. The educational profession has a most anomalous structure. One anomaly is frequently commented upon. The successful teacher becomes an administrator and thereby an ex-teacher. By comparison, the principle of promotion out of the job in which one is successful does not operate systematically in medicine, law, dentistry or even in post-secondary educational institutions. That peculiarity of school systems is compounded by a further anomaly. Change in school systems is promulgated and implemented principally by young, inexperienced, newly appointed administrators--that is how they become noticed and promoted further. So, whereas in most professions it is the older more experienced people who experiment and to whom the younger people are apprenticed, in education it is the younger and less experienced administrators who are responsible for implementing change, often in areas where they have limited competence. Thus the impetus for change

comes partly from the thrust of energetic, able teachers who are hoping for promotion out of teaching into administration and partly from administrators who have succeeded in getting out of teaching and who seek collegial and public approval and more promotion. The force for change does not come from senior practitioners in the field, well connected with research, who will first test and evaluate the experimental methods. The current approach, based on process rather than outcomes, is fed by schools of educational administration which display little interest in the analysis of the application of moral principles or research to major policy issues.

I am not asking that change be banished from the vocabulary of educational administration, although a five year sabbatical would be helpful. The forces of tradition and change should be set up in a dialectical counterpoint. As Shils points out, the thoughtless acceptance of change is worse than unthinking adherence to tradition; at least tradition testifies that something has once worked. However, genuine progress requires a careful probing of tradition and the careful testing of change.

Currently, the administrator change curricula as frequently as the teenager changes fashions and for the same reasons--to look good, to be accepted by one's peers, and to be one of the first to recognize the upcoming bandwagon. I know of few occasions where curricular change has been preceded by careful study of which objectives are achieved adequately, which are not achieved adequately and which good objectives are not addressed. Even where this is done, large scale change is rarely proceded by small, pilot studies to determine if the reforms effectively achieve their objectives. Occasionally, new curricula are rejected because of public outcry; hardly ever are they rejected on the basis of evaluations

of their achievements. In Ontario, frequent and massive curricular changes have been introduced over the last twenty years and educational expenditure per pupil has increased rapidly, over and above inflation. No one has demonstrated improvements in educational outcomes as a consequence, or at all.

Administrators in some of the more traditional schools of the future will require different abilities from those in contemporary situations. They will need a background in the arts and humanities--in literature, philosophy and history. They will need to unravel some of the basic policy questions and conflict in education. They will need a commitment to the values which underlie the traditional school: the search for truth, courage, justice, consideration for others, compassion, respect for achievement and independence. They will have to be able to help educators and others deal with the dialectic of tradition and change. They will have to learn to introduce change slowly, incrementally, and only when there is consensus and when the change has been proved effective. They will have to seek promotion on the grounds that they do old things better, rather than because there is stupefied wonder that these new things should be done at all. Slow movement in a consensually derived direction will be a better criterion of value than rapid, circular motion. They will have to learn to isolate and balance important principles which occasionally conflict--equality and excellence, individuality and social responsibility, truth and kindness. Their major concern will be education, rather than the management of power and the manipulation of people.

Barriers to a Traditional Revival

It would be disingenuous to imagine that traditionalism is the new wave, the latest bandwagon upon which every young, ambitious administrator should now leap. Nothing could be further from my expectations, or my desire. What I have

tried to do is present the challenge of traditionalism to educational administration and to develop some implications of that challenge. It may be helpful here to outline some of the major obstacles that lie in the path of a traditionalist revival.

The first is the obvious one, stressed by Shils: Tradition in western society is intellectually disreputable. The argument that one should do something because it is traditional is seen by the intelligentsia as quaint or simply unreasonable. Traditionalism is not set to take over schools of educational administration by storm. Even so, the rise of neo-conservatism and fundamentalist religion together with the growing recognition of traditional values evidenced by the publication of Character II[3] suggests that schools of educational administration will increasingly have to face the challenge of those who will defiantly resist the mainstream.

The most difficult objection for traditionalists to deal with lies in their first assumption. Just as most non-traditionalists must face the consequences of having no firm base of truth on which to build their platform so traditionalists must face the consequences of having one. This is the divide discussed by Bowers. It may be that two people on either side the divide may have more in common with each other than with others more distant from that divide. And Bowers' critics must be given heed as they caution against any single dichotomy that lacks the richness of a variety of philosophical positions. That said, traditionalists, must confront the charge that, at the core of their beliefs, is a set of assumptions which cannot be challenged. Philosophically, traditionalists may argue, with MacIntyre, that the substantive core of their ideology can be derived rationally and reasonably from our cultural inheritance. Despite that assurance, which will certainly not assuage all doubters, the fact remains that traditionalists place within education a

core of character training, a core representing the irreducible basis of traditional culture. Again, they may agree that even this core can be challenged in school, discussed, questioned--but its de facto abandonment will not be countenanced. Students who habitually and deliberately practise lying and injustice will be less tolerated in a truly traditional school than in a truly liberal school.

That leads to a third, powerful objection to traditionalism--the fragmentation necessitated by the maintenance of tradition in multi-ethnic countries such as Canada and the U.S.A. If tradition is based essentially on the cultural inheritance of the western, Greco-Roman Judeo-Christian inheritance, does that not exclude those who come from different cultural backgrounds? Certainly the not unreasonable belief that it does is a significant barrier to the adoption of traditionalism. The fact that the contemporary nihilist, materialistic and individualistic culture of western society is sometimes even more offensive to people coming from other traditionalist cultures whose own traditions are not dissimilar to many western traditions is lost in the rhetorical arguments about freedom, tolerance and multiculturalism. Traditionalists will be open to the integration, as distinct from the assimilation, of different ethnic traditions; integration is a slow and natural process. They will be accepting too of a culturally distinct community maintaining its differences, its traditions, but not with the help or promulgation of government.

Another objection to a rebirth of traditionalism is that it is based on a notion of authority that is no longer extant. It is simply not possible to expect principals and superintendents to regain the legitimate authority they once held. This is undeniable and traditional authority will doubtlessly be modified. The tradition of the family has been modified, the authority of the father being much

diminished. Yet, traditionalists still put enormous value on the preservation of the family, much more so than do modernists who welcome change in the form of non-traditional family structures. Just as traditionalists value the integrated nuclear family with its core of shared values and community, so they value the unity, community and authority of the school. The fact that the father in the family and the principal in the school are less symbolic of that authority than they once were is less important.

The rise of traditionalism does not and cannot mean the turning back of the hands of history to some earlier time. Traditions change, grow, adapt. The problem is to maintain the substance of tradition without accepting slavish devotion to practices which have ceased to support, if they ever did, the core values to which traditionalists adhere.

Conclusion

Several premises underlie the notion that the field of educational administration should change to accommodate traditionalist ideas. First, the assumption is made that administration is more than day-to-day management. It includes involvement in policy development as well as considerable discretionary behavior in the area of policy implementation, maintenance, renewal and evaluation. Second, the choices inherent in truly administrative behavior have moral components. Third, administration when applied to education brings in a second moral component, as education itself is concerned with the desired and the desirable shaping of a society's young people.

Despite the core of value, which few will seriously deny, most current work in educational administration outside Australia, notably in North America, purports to limit the impact of human values, to argue implicitly that leadership,

decision making, and organizational effectiveness can be examined and taught without studying the values that underlie them, and without even considering the values underlying the educational policies with whose implementation those processes are concerned. It is as though surgeons were taught not to worry about physiological concerns; instead they should work at decision making among the surgical team and how to give nurses a sense of ownership of the patient; as though supreme court justices were trained not to consider the search for judicial truth through precedent, but how to give their findings public acceptance and how to manipulate lawyers.

Traditionalists will have to face a crucial dilemma: Either they abandon their fight for common schools projecting common, national traditions, and opt for alternative schools which will embrace their beliefs, or they must face powerful interest groups of educators, to whom traditionalism is an insidious threat to their beliefs, their practices and even their jobs.

The implications of resurgent traditionalism are equally important for both educational practitioners and teachers of administration. For the former, their most difficult task will be the spiritual commitment to an "old-fashioned" set of educational goals. It will be difficult to accept an accountability for results, after years of being able to blame the ills of society, or parents, or some other handy demon for all the failures of schools. For professors of administration, the change will be no less great. There will remain a need for instruction in managerial tasks. But potential administrators may choose to obtain a broad educational background from programs in the philosophy and humanities rather than programs in desiccated educational "theory".

NOTES

1. This paper is based on two earlier papers dealing with related topics: "Educational administration after MacIntyre: Which way forward?" Presented at the annual conference of the Canadian Society for the Study of Education, Guelph, 1984: and "The revival of traditional thought and its effects on educational administration: The case of decision making," presented at the annual conference of the Canadian Society for the Study of Education, Montreal, 1985. Both are available from the author.

2. This point is further developed in Holmes (1986).

3. Character II is published by ARL Services Inc., P.O. Box 88, Posen, IL 60469-0088.

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